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II 
RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
PAUL VALLIERE 
This essay describes the sitUation and orienration of the Russian Orthodox 
Church with respect co human tights. Along the broad spectrnm of rights I 
focus mainly on the civil righrs of individuals and nonstate associarions rarher 
than the subsistence rights and rightS to social services mat figure so promi­
nently in socialisr meories of rights. By this I do not mean co suggest mat me 
rights wimwhich socialists are concerned are ofsecondary importance. It is sim­
ply a question of accepting me demands of my subject. Ever since me disestab­
lishment and disenfranchisemenr of me Russian Onhodox Church as a result 
of me Russian Revolution the rights wim which the church has been concerned 
are the rights of individual believers and of the church as an institution. These 
concerns were stimulated nor by theology or ideology bur by the harsh facts of 
life in the Soviet petiod: widespread persecution of religious believers and the 
vittual absence of civil rights respecting teligion. TIle extem to which prerevo­
lurionary Russian Onhodoxy may have helped to prepare the ground on which 
Soviet socialism was built is an issue that exceeds the scope of mis essay. 
Whether the Russian Orthodox Church is concerned abour human tights 
at all has been a matter ofdebate. The view that me church is little more than 
a tOol in the hands of whatevet state governs Russia at a given rime is wide­
spread in the West and may not be much affected by the qualification that 
"Russian Orthodox Church," in this essay, means not JUSt the hietatchs who 
represem the church on the national or inrernationallevel but the whole com-
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pany ofOtthodox believers who accept the church of the Patriarch ofMoscow 
as their own. But even sympathetic observers of the Russian Orthodox 
Chutch would agree that the church has been more passive in social and polit­
ical terms, and more subservient to the state than many churches in the West 
in modern times. In recent yeats the COntrast has been highlighted by the 
example of the Roman Catholic Church ofPoland, which managed to estab­
lish itself as a kind ofsurrogate civil society in a Communist state well inside 
the zone of Soviet hegemony. 
To explain the relative passivity of the Russian Orthodox Church some 
observers have pointed ro special characteristics of Eastern Orthodoxy, oth­
ers ro the legacy of the tsarist state church, still others to the btutalization of 
the church by the Soviet state in the 1920S and 1930S. Each of these faCtors is 
important, although the last deserves attention first because it is the most 
obvious cause of the social and political weakness of the church in presenr­
day Russia. 
In 1914 the Russian Orthodox Church was the largest Christian church in 
the world after the Roman Catholic Church and the largest of all national 
churches. It supporred 68 dioceses, over 50,000 priests, more than 60,000 
deacons and psalmiSts, almost 100,000 monks and nuns in more than 1,000 
monasteties, 57 theological seminaries, and 4 graduate schools of theology. I 
The vast majority of the Russian empire's 100,000,000 Great Russians, 
Uktainians, and Belarusians as well as significant numbers of minority peo­
ples wete baptized members of the Orthodox Church. 
This huge church was also an institution struggling to renew itself. A 
reform movement had begun in the early yeats of the twentieth century and 
acquired new strengrh after the February Revolution of1917. The restoration 
of the Patriarchate of Moscow in November 1917 afrer a lapse of more than 
two centuties was the signal accomplishmenr of the movement. However, the 
disestablishment of rhe church by decree of rhe Sovier government in January 
1918, rhe dislocations of rhe civil war and the violent repression of rhe hierar­
chyand clergy in rhe early 1920S left the church in a stare of disttess by the 
time Parriarch Tikhon died in 1925. The refusal of the Sovier governmenr to 
allow the church to hold a national council to elect a successor to the 
deceased patriarch furrher weakened the instirution. The declaration of loy­
alty to the Soviet state in 1927 by the locum tenens of the patriarchal office, 
Metropolitan Sergii, brought the church no secular benefits and precipitated 
a schism in the Orthodox community. What remained of the institution was 
consumed in the genetal holocaUSt of the 1930S. By 1939 the Russian 
Orthodox Church was one of the weakest churches in Christendom. It had 
no head, no diocesan administtation, few ptiests or bishops at liberty, and 
very few functioning parishes. 
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The revival of the Russian Orthodox Church began during World War II. 
It was a spontaneous phenomenon at the local level as well as the result of 
the warrime government policy of fostering traditional Russian patriotism. 
Metropolitan Sergii was elected pattiarch by a small meeting of bishops in 
1943, and after Sergii's death in 1945 Metropolitan Aleksii of Leningrad was 
chosen to teplace him. Diocesan adminisrration was rescoted, and a few the­
ological schools and monasteries were reconstimted. The rescored church 
was not comparable in size, much less in power, to the prerevolutionary 
church. 2 Nevertheless, the posrwar simation represented a dramatic change 
fot the better. 
Unforrunately the church's gains proved vulnerable co the caprices of 
Communist policymakers. In the early 1960s the Khrushchev government 
launched a new antireligious campaign that led ro the closing of about half the 
patishes reopened during the war. After Khrushchev's fall in 1964 the govern­
ment disconrinued the campaign but did not resrore what had been wrested 
from the church. In this sense the campaign was a vicrory for the state. 
Howevet, it produced an unintended and unprecedented side effect; the 
Orrhodox rights movement. 
The Orthodox rights movement is a natural focal point for the discussion 
of Russian Otthodoxy and human rights. However, co appreciate the sigifi­
cance of the movement one must consider the ecclesiastical and civil contexts 
in which it arose. The ecclesiastical context was shaped by Eastern Orthodox 
tradition. The civil context was shaped by Soviet law. 
ORTHODOX TRADITION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
Historically Eastern Orthodox tradition has been less disposed to defending 
human rights than Roman Catholic or classical Protestant traditions. ihe 
Roman Catholic Church, while often antagonistic ro individual liberty, has 
always defended its rights as an international ecclesiastical polity standing 
above secular polities and having cerrain claims on them. The church's claims 
serve co limit the power of the state ovet persons in Roman Catholic coun­
tries. Protestantism. while lacking the international structure and legalist 
genius of the Roman Catholic Church, provides a hospitable ground for the 
cultivation of rightS by according individual conscience a central tole in the 
religious value system. The configuration of values in Eastern Orthodoxy 
shares something with both Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, but not 
those aspects that most prompt an intetest in rights. Like Roman Cathol­
icism, Eastern Orchodoxy propounds a highly corporate and sacramental view 
of salvation and so does not encourage individualism on religious grounds. 
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Like Protestantism, however, Eastern Orthodoxy never tires ofpreaching that 
Christiani ty is a religion of grace, not law, for which reason it rejects the 
coumer-secular legalism of Roman Catholicism.3 The result is a theological 
conceptuality less promising fOt the CUltivation of rights rhan one finds in the 
Westetn Christian tradirions. 
Yet it would be wrong to deny the possibility of a rights orien tation arising 
in Eastetn Orthodoxy. Like all great faith tradirions, Orthodoxy comprises 
concepts of human dignity which can at least sUppOrt, if they do not neces­
sarily generate, the idea of human rights. Furthermore, under the pressure of 
historic challenges people often find new meaning in traditional ideals. Thus, 
while some of the most important ideals of Orthodoxy tend to discourage 
individuals from viewing themselves as rights-bearers over against the com­
munity, and discourage the community from viewing itself as distinct from 
the state, these ideals did not prevent a lively Orthodox rights movemem from 
developing in the very untraditional circumstances of the Soviet Union. 
The Orthodox view of the telation of the individual to the community has 
been profoundly shaped by the ideal ofwholeness. In the Orthodox vision sal­
vadon in Christ comes about through incorporation intO his sactamental 
community, the church or "body ofChrisr." The church achieves public def­
inition through its liturgy, dogmas, and canons; but its essential quality is rhe 
mystical wholeness which these forms are meant ro embody. For Orrhodoxy 
"the church" means the whole company of saints seeking to embrace the 
whole of humankind and reconcile it with the whole cosmos.4 The Russian 
word for this wholeness is sobornost'. It comes from a root meaning "gather." 
"Conciliarity" and "catholici ty" are specialized ecclesiastical translations of 
the term. Sobol' also means "cathedral," which suggests perhaps the best pic­
ture of sobornost'. One imagines a crowd of worshipers of all ages and srations 
of life gathered for liturgy under the dome of a cathedral. As the liturgy 
unfolds, the choral music, the colorful icons of saints and angels. the smell of 
incense and wax and the hieratic vestments, postures, and processions of the 
clergy conspire to induce a powerful sense of incorporation into a great, pul­
sating whole. Indeed, the Orthodox liturgy offers more than a picture of 
sobornost'; it actualizes it. 
Orthodox thinkers are careful to distinguish sobornost' from collectivism or 
egalitarianism. They see [he church as a community of persons, each with a 
unique contribution to make to the whole. Lichnost', "personhood," stands 
close to sobornost' in [he Orthodox hierarchy of values. It is reflected, for 
example, in the group portraits of traditional iconography in which the artist 
typically accotds to each individual some distinguishing feature of dress, coif­
fure, expression, posture, or function. 5The structure of the liturgy, roo, offers 
the laity ample opportunity to direct their attention to individual needs, con­
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cems, and sources of inspirarion. Srill, in classical Orthodoxy rhe individual is 
nor regarded as the telos of the communiry. The idea of lichnost' suggesrs per­
sonalism bur nor individualism. To rhe Orrhodox mind rhe whole appears 
grearer, more esrimable, more secure than rhe parts.G The rendency of 
Orthodox thinkers is to synrhesize, nor analyze; w integrate, not isolate. This 
is especially true of modern Orthodox thinkers, who have had w defend the 
Orthodox er1lOs againsr material and spiritual threats from the Wesr. 7 Most 
Russian Orthodox thinkers in modern rimes, such as Khomiakov, l(jreevsky, 
Dosroevsky, Leonriev, Fyodorov, and Solzhenirsyn, have held a community 
based on sobornost' and lichnost', wholeness and personhood, ro be ethicaHy 
superior to a community based on rhe social contract and individual righrs. 
Hand in hand wirh this view went a "tradirion of rhe censure oflaw" in Russia, 
an ami-legal prej udice which inevitably impeded the development ofmodern 
conceprions of human righrs.8 
If the ideal of wholeness discouraged individuals from viewing themselves 
aparr from rhe community, ir also made the Orthodox Church slow to dis­
ringuish itself from the state. The polirical dependency of the churches in the 
Orthodox Easr conrrasts sharply with the partern of chutch-State relarions 
rhat developed in the West. Since rhe Reform Papacy of the eleventh century 
the Roman Catholic Church has defined itself juridically as a countersrate or 
supers rate distincr from secular sovereignties. While Rome was by no means 
always successful in enforcing irs claims, the ideal wok root. Also, r11e need to 
arbirtare between ecclesiasrical and secular sovereignties was one of the chief 
morivarions for rhe development of law in the West, including rhe language 
and methodology of rights. Among rhe theological disciplines canon law 
played a particuJarly dynamic role. In the Orthodox Easr, by contrast, the par­
tern of church-Stare relarions wok shape much earlier, in the fourth and fifth 
centuries, and embodied rhe ideal of harmony (sympho7lia) rather than dual­
ism. Church and srate were seen not as competing jurisdictions but as twO 
aspecrs, sacramental and lay, ofan organic whole. The ideal left litrle room for 
concepts of conflict or propheric rension between church and srare. Canon 
law was a conservative discipline. 
To be sure, there were conflicts between church and stare in rhe Chtistian 
East, including fierce confrontations such as the Iconoclastic controversy in 
eighth-century Byzanrium and the Schism (Rasko/) in seventeenth-centuty 
Muscovy. But these episodes did nor inspire creative new concepts of church­
stare relations. The chief effect of the Russian Schism, for example, was ro 
weaken the established church and cause it w accept an even more subservient 
role in the Russian state system on the eve of modern rimes. 
The ascerical ideal also presents an obstacle ro a righrs orientarion in 
Orthodoxy. The mosr esreemed form of religious virruosity in Orthodoxy is 
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not that of the prophetic emissary, militant reformer, crusader, or preacher, 
but that of the monk. The monk is a kind of religious individualist, but his 
individualism is inspired by the call ro leave the world, not transform it. This 
ideal played a fateful role in the structuring of the Orthodox clergy. In 
Orthodoxy the parish clergy are mostly married men, bur bishops must be 
monks. While mis arrangement has its advantages (e.g., clerical celibacy has 
nor been the divisive issue in Orthodoxy rhat it has been in Roman 
Catholicism), ir has unquestionably limited the capacity of rhe clergy to 
mobilize in defense of the secular rights of the church. Parish priests have been 
too enmeshed in the economic and familial nerworks of "this" world ro chal­
lenge it in the name of the next. 
The hierarchy, on the orher hand, while bearing the chief responsibility for 
the government of the church in "this" world, has all roo often failed ro value 
this responsibility in positive rerms. Practicing ascetical renunciation at the 
expense of the church, so ro speak, Orthodox hierarchs have often accepted 
oppression by secular authorities as a test of parience rather than of power. 
Commenting on rhis informal "cooperation of tradition and oppression," 
Vladimir Zelinsky righcly observes that "in Orthodoxy it is not weakness of 
the will as such but precisely a zealous piety thar demands a spirit of bound­
less submissiveness."9 
Along with a weak parish clergy went a weak parish srructure. In tsarist 
Russia rhe Orthodox parish was a sleepy, unpropheric place because it was roo 
much a part of irs environment. Religious and social community were basi­
cally identical. The local priest usually inherited his position from his or his 
wife's father. The concept of the parish as a unit of social, political, or mis­
sionary mobilization rarely arose, and rhe concept of the church as a volun­
tary association did not arise at all. These ideas were absent during the Soviet 
period, roo, although for the opposite reason; religious and social community 
were too sharply divorced. Because gatherings of believers outside liturgy were 
prohibited, people who prayed together had little opportunity ro work or even 
talk together. Also, since open churches were few, tar apart, and crowded, wor­
shipers usually did not get to know each other or their clergy very well. The 
Orthodox parish became an impersonal and diffuse community despite the 
fervent piety which no observer could fail ro note. 10 
The ideal of national religious establishment also contributed to the pas­
sivity of the Orthodox Church toward the state. In tsarist Russia religious 
establishment dulled rhe church's awareness of the extent to which it was a 
captive of the srare system. The Russian Revolution swepr away the establish­
ment bur nor the cultural and ecclesiastical mentality underlying it. 10 this 
day most Russian Orthodox clergy and laity cherish the ideal of a national 
church. Russian Orthodox people do not think of rheir church as one denom­
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ination Q[ sect among othets but as the Chmch of Russia. a chmch whose des­
tiny is tied to that of the Russian people. II This view disposes the O[[hodox 
community co be more patiem with the Russian people and theit state than 
religious groups that see themselves as a prophetic minority. 
The cominuing hold of an establishmemarian, amisectarian memality 
helps co explain some of the episodes of accommodation co the state in the 
Soviet period beginning with Metropolitan Sergii's declaration of loyalty in 
1927. Fathet Joh n Meyendorff has wri[[en abom this comroversial event: 
The goal of Metropolitan Sergii was TO preserve not himself, but the church. with 
all its liturgical order, buildings and central administrative organs. He consciously 
refused co limit his thinking to "the salvation of the minority. not the majority," as 
was done by Bishop Damaskin and others who went "underground." In his view 
the Church-wirh its essential apostolic succession in the episcopate and its (some­
times burdensome) heritage of divine services, theology and canons-could not 
exist for long as a secr. The historical example of the Russian Old Believers had 
confirmed this. 12 
Such an imerpretation of the chutch's accommodation co the state is more 
satisfying than one focusing on political terrOr, moral cowardice, or the infJ­
rration of the hierarchy by state agents, for it takes the Orthodox value system 
imo accoum. Metropolitan Sergli was speaking about Orthodoxy, not other 
churches, when he asserted that "only impractical dreamers can rhink that 
such an immense community as our Orthodox Church, with all its organiza­
tions, may peacefully exist in this country while hiding itself from the gov­
ernment." 13 One may question the wisdom ofMerropolitan Sergii's policy on 
tactical grounds, for it brought the church no real gains. Bur one can scarcely 
fault the Orthodox Church for trying co remain itself. 
At the same time, the ideal of a national church can make a positive con­
tribution co the consciousness of rights in a country co rhe extent that it fos­
ters a sense of legitimacy on the part of the religious community. The sense 
of legitimacy is typically long-lasting. To pUt it another way. if rhe negative 
side of Orthodox patience is passiviry in the face of oppression, the posirive 
side is endurance. Despite decades of Communist propaganda and repres­
sion, countless Russians petsist in the conviCtion thar the Onhodox Church 
has a righ rful place in their land and a self-evident claim co itS alienated 
monuments. These people may not express theit view in legalistic terms. 
Moreover, the tights at stake are not generalizable: we might call them "his­
roric rights" rather than "human rights." Nevertheless, the view that 
Orthodoxy has rights in the Russian land is a key facrot in the behavior of 
the Orthodox Church in present-day Russia and was also an important, if 
Russian I 
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ambiguous, resource for rhe Soviet human righrs movemenr. I re£urn to rhe 
discussion of histOric righrs larer. 
SOV1ET LAw ON RELIGION 
On October I, 1990, rhe Supreme Soviet of the Congress of People's Depuries 
of rhe USSR adopred a new law on religion, rhe Law on Freedom of 
Conscience and Religious Organizations. Larer in the same momh rhe 
Supreme Sovier of the Russian republic (RSFSR) passed a comparable piece 
of legislarion, rhe Law on Freedom of Religion. 14 These fWO laws complerely 
ovenumed previous Sovier legislarion on religion. To understand the situation 
of Russian Onhodoxy and human rights in the Soviet period, however, one 
must examine rhe earlier legislation. 
Soviet law on religion embodied fWO cardinal principles. First, only indi­
vidual believers had rights; churches and religious associarions did nor. 
Second, the right of believers to pracrice their religion was limited to the area 
of ritual. 
These principles srood out clearly in the first piece of Soviet legislation on 
religion, the decree of the Sovier of People's Commissars on Separation of the 
Church from the State and the Schools from rhe Church of January X9t8.15 
The decree revoked all civil restricrions connected with religious affdiarion 
and mandated thar "in all official documents every memion of a citizen's reli­
gious affiliation or nonaffiliarion shall be removed." It granted cirizens rhe 
right to "confess any religion or profess none at all," "free performance of reli­
gious rires ... as long as it does nor dismrb public order or infringe upon the 
rights of citizens of the Soviet Republic," and the right "ro receive and give 
religious insuuction privarely." 
Religious associations, however, were denied vinually all righ tS, not just the 
privileges connected with religious establishment such as adminisrration of 
oaths, sanctification of public ceremonies, and registrarion of marriages and 
births. The decree barred religious associations from holding properry, orga­
nizing schools, and going to law. It stated categorically that ecclesiasrical and 
religious associations "do not have the rights of a legal entiry." 
The only concession concerned access ro property designed for rimal use: 
"Buildings and objecrs inrended especially for religious rites shall be handed 
over, by special decision of rhe local or cenrral governmental authorities, free 
of charge for use to responsible religious associations." Since this provision 
appeared in rhe arricle narionalizing the properry of religious associations 
(Article 13) it clearly meanr ro distinguish use from ownership. Moreover, as 
the article leEr rhe gran ring of use of STare property ro rhe "special decision" of 
I 
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the state authorities, it could scarcely be interpreted [Q imply a firm right ro 
such use. Finally, the use of stare properry by believers was granted specifically 
for the performance of rituals. Social service, missionary work, political 
action, religious publishing, and orher rypes of religious activiry outside the 
rirual sphere were nor menrioned at all. 
It is inreresring to note that rhe decree of the Soviet of People's Commissars 
made no mention of atheism. The righr ro profess no religion covers the case 
of atheism but extends also to agnosticism, free-thinking, and deism. 
Furthermore, the decree did not accord special privileges to nonbelievers or 
systems of nonbelief. Yet atheism played an integral role in the formation and 
evolution of the Soviet Union as an ideological state, and eventually it fouod 
a privileged place in Soviet fundamental Jaw. The constitution of 1977, con­
tinuing in rhe rradition of its predecessor (1936), granted a kind of establish­
menr to arheism in so far as it accorded the leading role in Soviet sociery ro 
"the Communist Parry atmed with Marxist-Leninist doctrine" (Article 6).16 It 
also gtanted an advantage to atheists in the marter of propagating their faith: 
"Freedom of conscience is guaranteed to citizens of the USSR, that is, the 
right to confess any teligion or to confess none at all, ro perform religious cults 
or ro conduct atheistic propaganda" {Article 52).17 In othet words, atheists had 
a constitutional right to spread their wotd; believers did not. 
The most detailed piece of legislation on religion in the Soviet period was 
the Law on Religious Associations of1929.18 The law introduced the distinc­
tive mechanism for the regulation of teligion in the Sovier Union, the dvadt­
satka, or "group of !Wenry." The decree of January 1918 provided that build­
ings and cult objects could be handed over for use ro "tesponsible religious 
associations." The problem for the state was how to implement this policy 
without appeating to extend tecognition or privileges to actual ecclesiasrical 
instirutions, such as conciliar bodies, the patriarch, bishops, assemblies of 
clergy or patish councils. The Law on Religious Associations came up with a 
solution: the authotities at the ciry or district level would lend state property 
(Q groups of nor fewer than !Wenry believets who accepted formal registration 
as a religious association and responsibiliry for the property temporarily 
entrusted to them. The dvadtsatka was an ad hoc group, nor a corporate body. 
The rights oflegal entiry and the right of assembly without the permission of 
the local authoriries were denied ro it. Needless to say, the dvadtsatka did nor 
correspond to the canonical inStitutions ofany chutch. Strictly speaking, with 
the introduction of the dvadtsatka the Russian Orthodox parish as well as all 
ecclesiastical institutions beyond rhe parish level ceased to exist as entities 
enjoying recognition or protection under public law. 
As long as state policy aimed at the destruction of the church me Law on 
Religious Associations corresponded ro realiry and assisted the implementa-
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tion of policy. The change of direction during the war years, however, pro­
duced a conrradictoty siwation. The Russian Orrhodox Church, permirred 
and even encouraged ro reconsriwte itself, naturally followed its tradirional 
canons. On rhe local level rhis meanr rhe reconsriwrion of the patish wim a 
cletical rector ar its head. The regulations on parish life adopred by the Local 
(i.e., Narional) Council of the Russian Orrhodox Church in January 1945 
acknowledged the dvadtsatka bur stipulared that the clerical rector should 
head ir. 19 The "religious association" of1929 became a "parish society," rho ugh 
not wirh the sanction of Soviet law. . 
The comradiction lasred umil rhe Khrushchev persecution, which undid 
the teligious setrlement of the war years. In July 1961 a council of bishops of 
me Russian Orrhodox Church approved me elimination of me clergy from 
chairmanship and membership of parish councils, effecrively removing mem 
from parish governmenr. 20 The bishops claimed to be remedying abuses as 
well as relieving priests ofburdensome secular duties ro allow them more time 
for pasroral work. In fact rhe hierarchs were bowing (0 state pressure ro resrore 
a strict interptetarion of the dvadtsatka of 1929. The All-Russian Council of 
1971, me first national council of the church held after 1945, did not abrogate 
the arrangements of 1961, nor did the anlendmems [0 me Law on Religious 
Associations in 1975 change it in any fundamental way.2! Nor until the 
Gorbachev reforms of the mid-198os was there a him in any official source 
that Soviet law on religion needed [0 be changed. 
THE ORTHODOX RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
The Orthodox rights movemem was part of the Soviet human rights move­
ment and developed along parallel lines. 22 The Soviet human rights move­
ment dates ftom the Constitlltion Day demonsuation in Moscow's Pushkin 
Square on Decembet 15, 1965, by intelligentsia protesting the arrest of rhe 
writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuly Daniel. The key demand was a public trial 
for me accused. The protesters believed that publicity would expose me gap 
between the letter of Soviet law and its adminiStration by the authorities. 
"Respect the Soviet Constiwtion!" was the slogan of the day.23 
On the same day me Orrhodox rights movement surfaced in an open let­
ter ro N. V Podgorny, chairman of the Ptesidium of the Supteme Soviet of me 
USSR, written by the Moscow priests Gleb Yakunin and Nikolai Eshliman. 
The priests ptesented a detailed btief alleging violations of Soviet law on reli­
gion by me state authorities. Two days earlier the ptiests had sem a lerret ro 
Patriarch Aleksii I atguing meir case in theological terms. They sem copies of 
both lerrets to the entire Russian Ormodox hierarchy.24 While there had been 
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other protests by Orthodox clergy and lairy in 1965 regarding rhe state of 
affairs produced by the Khrushchev persecution, the witness of Yakunin and 
Eshliman was especially important because of its connection with the wider 
Soviet human rights movement. 
The number ofclergy and lairy involved in the Orthodox rights movement 
was small. It was a movement of heroic individuals, as was the Soviet human 
rights movement generally. As for the hierarchs, they made a practice of dis­
ciplining activist clergy and keeping their distance from dissident laity.25 
Yakunin and Eshliman, for example, were removed from their parishes and 
banned from exercising priestly office (although nor defrocked) following the 
open letters of 1965. 
There were numerous links between rhe Orthodox acrivists and the wider 
human righrs movement. The first human rights organization in the Soviet 
Union, the Initiative Group for rhe Defense of Human Rights in rhe USSR, 
formed in 1969, counted the Orthodox lay hisrorian Anaroly Levitin-Krasnov 
among irs founders. The Committee for Human Righrs in rhe USSR, formed 
in 1970 by Valery Chalidze and others, rook a lively interest in religious rightS 
cases.26 Orthodox publicists contributed frequently ro the samizdat literature 
in which the Soviet dissident intelligentsia conducted irs debares. 27 The grear­
esr publicisr of the period, the Orthodox layman Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, 
publicly embraced rhe Orthodox rights movement in his "Lenten Letter" to 
Patriarch Pi men in 1972. The leuer appeared in rhe Wesrern press shortly after 
Solzhenirsyn's first major interview wirh Western reporters in many years in 
March 1972.28 The interview marked the beginning of the explosive period of 
Solzhenitsyn's acrivism, culminating in the publication of The Gulag 
Archipelago in December 1973 and his expulsion from the Sovier Union rhe 
following February. 
The Moscow Helsinki Warch Group, which announced its program in 
May 1976, found its Orthodox counterparr in the Chrisrian Committee for 
the Defense of the Rights of Religious Believers in the USSR, although 
Orthodox Christians were also to be found in the leadership of rhe Helsinki 
Group. The Christian Committee, founded in December 1976 by Father 
Gleb Yakunin and orhers, was a watch group specializing in religious cases. 29 
Irs interdenominarional concern wirh the rights of all believers, not jusr 
Orthodox, reflected the extent to which rhe Orthodox rights movement had 
been shaped by the general human righrs movement. The Chrisrian 
Committee also followed rhe lead of the Helsinki Group in promoting the 
internarionalization of the struggle for human rights on rhe basis of the 
Helsinki accords of1975. In October of that year Father Yakunin and the lay 
church hisrorian Lev Regelson addressed an open letter to rhe delegates of 
the Fifth Assembly of the World Council of Churches meeting in Nairobi 
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in which they pUt forward the idea of an interchurch effort to defend reli­
gious rights, in essence the idea that the Christian Committee was formed 
to serve a year la ter.30 
During the repressions of the late 1970S and early 1980s the Orthodox 
rights movement suffered the same fate as the general human rights move­
ment. The attack on the leadership of the Helsinki Group began with the 
arrest of many of its founding members in February and March 1977, includ­
ing Yury Orlov, Anatoly Shcharansky and the Orthodox layman Aleksandr 
Ginzburg. The repression of the Christian Committee began on the eve of the 
invasion of AfghaniStan and the exile of Andrei Sakharov from Moscow 
(December 1979-January 1980). Father Gleb Yakunin was arrested in 
November 1979, and most of the other leaders were detained in the following 
months. In 1980 Yakunin was sentenced to five years in prison followed by five 
years of internal exile. 
The association of the Orthodox rights aCtivists with the general human 
rights movemeut was not JUSt ptagmatic but extended to values and method­
ology. The distinguishing characteristic of the Soviet human rights movement 
in contrast to orher dissident tendencies (especially nationalism) was its para­
mount concern with law and the cultivation of respect for law in Soviet soci­
ety. In the words of Pave! Lirvinov the movement represented 
nor only a rebirol of goodness and merc)', bur rhe birrh of a sense of law in Sovier 
sociery. For rhe firsr rime rhe inrelligenrsia recognized rhar the Soviet constiTUrion, 
in spire of all irs imperfections, is a fundamental law which in irs lener prorecrs rheir 
digniry as cirizens, on paper defends human righrs. The hnman rights movement 
discovered a powerful lever ofsocial rransformacion, namely law, when ir turned Ole 
anen rion of the Sovier bureaucrac)' as well as ofsociery and Ole resr of rhe world [Q 
rhe lack of conformiry beTWeen Ole conducr of rhe regime and the constirution and 
Sovier legislarion, and also ro [he many inrernarional convenrions and rrearies on 
human rights which rhe Soviet Union has rarified nor so much wirh a view [Q cheir 
execution as ro its own international repurarion.)l 
The same attention to law was typical of the Orthodox rights movement. 
Yakunin and Eshliman's letter to Podgorny is a good example, indeed one of 
the earliest examples of the new legal consciousness cited by Lirvinov. The let­
ter protested the policies of the Council for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs 
of rhe Council of Ministers of the USSR, the state agency responsible for 
supervision of the Orthodox Church.32 The priests charged that the council's 
policies violated both the principles and the particulars of Soviet law on reli­
gion. In the introduction to the letter, for example, the priests faulted the 
council fot conducting most of its business otaUy. "The very method of using 
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unofficial oral decrees, which the leaders and representarives of the Soviet for 
Russian Orthodox Church Affairs chose as a means of sysremaric interference 
in the internal life of the Orthodox Church, is a violation of the principles of 
the Law. "33 In rhe body of the letrer the authors discussed eight cypes of vio­
lations of Soviet law on religion: registration of clergy as a means of interfer­
ing with their placement, mass closing of churches and monasteries and ille­
galliquidarion of religious societies, registration of baprisms and Other sacra­
mental acts, restriction of ritual practices, violation of rhe principle of freedom 
of conscience with respecr to children, interference in the financial life of 
church communiries, limiration of the number of members of a religious soci­
ety to the group of twency, and limitations on the sraffing of clerical positions. 
The argumentation in all of rhese cases was deliberately legalis ric. The 
priesrs rook rheir stand on rhe decree on Separarion of the Church from the 
State and the Schools from the Church, the Law on Religious Associarions, 
and other relevant legislarion. In many particulars rheir arguments were quite 
compelling. Ir was difficult ro deny, for example, that the registration of bap­
tisms by local governmenral authorities amounted to official documentarion 
of religious affiliation, specifically excluded by rhe dectee on Separation of the 
Church from the Stare and rhe Schools from the Church. The priests also 
made a good case when they argued that the cusromary limitarion of the 
responsible membership of religious associarions to twency individuals was 
nor warranted by rhe Law on Religious Associarions, which required only that 
associarions be composed of "not fewer" than twenty citizens. The authors 
exposed anorher unwarranted inference when they argued that legal liquida­
tion of a prayer house by local authorities should not automatically signify the 
dissolution of the teligious association that occupied it. 
From the beginning the Soviet human rights movement wrestled with the 
tension between respect for Soviet law and the need to change it. In the area of 
religious rights this tension was especially severe because of the paucicy of rights 
accorded to religion in the first place. In theit letter to Podgorny, Yakunin and 
Eshliman held firmly to the theme of respecting and enfotcing existing Soviet 
law. As the tights movement gained momemum, however, its critique became 
more radical. The internationalization of the snuggle for rights after the 
Helsinki accords of 1975 also tended to sharpen criticism of Soviet realicy. In 
1977, when a nationwide discussion of rhe draft of rhe new consriturion was 
taking place, the Christian Committee ventured ro raise the issue of the pref­
erential rreatment of atheism in the constiturion in a letter to Brezhnev.34 
To be sure, there was no comradicrion between pteaching respecr for law 
and attempting to change it at the same time. The new legal consciousness 
embraced both causes. Almost no one in the Sovier human rights movemem 
advocated working for change by violent, exrralegal means. 
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The Orthodox righrs acrivists represented a challenge to rhe church as well 
as ro the state. They did not quesrion the legirimacy of the Patriarchal church, 
as some Russian Onhodox splinter groups did. They did not even question 
the policy of peaceful accommodation with rhe Soviet srare. They did ques­
tion the church's acquiescence in policies rhat rurned accommodation into a 
one-sided relationship of dependence prejudicial to the integrity of rhe 
church, and they challenged the Patriarch and the bishops ro playa more 
aggressive role in conteSting such policies. 
Again, Farhers Yakunin and Eshliman srated the case besr. Their lerter to 
Patriarch Aleksii I in 1965, incorporaring the legal case made in rhe lerter to 
Podgorny, lent theological and ecclesiastical perspective to their cririque. In 
spitir rhe letter was prophetic rather than legalisric. The priests cried out 
against practices in the eanhly, everyday church which contradicted the tran­
scendent realiry of the church. 
The letter consisted of three parts. In the firsr the aurhors pointed our that 
a theological as well as a legal principle was at srake in the violation of religious 
rights. Citing rhe words of Jesus, "Render untO Caesar the things that are 
Caesar's, and unto God rhe things that are God's" (Matk 12:17), the priests 
atgued that these words "put an end to rhe claims of a pagan state to toral 
dominion over man," which is why "for the firsr time in history Chtisrian 
dOCtrine proclaimed the infinite value of human personaliry."35 In the second 
part of the leerer the authors discussed a matter not raised in the letter to 
Podgorny: the prerogatives of the parish priest. With copious citarions from 
Orthodox ca.non law the authots argued tbar rhe decision of the council of 
bishops in 1961 to remove priesrs from the parish councils produced a fla­
grantly uncanonical state of affairs at rhe local level of Orthodox church life 
and offended the digniry of rhe priestly office. An epigraph ro this section of 
the letrer put it poignantly: "the hireling is not a shepherd" Uohn lO:n). In 
rhe Ia..~t pan of the letter rbe authors reviewed rhe glories and tribulations of 
the Orthodox Church in Russian history and concluded wirh an appeal ro the 
parriarch to lead the church our of its bondage to secular authoriry, if neces­
sary at rhe price of his own securiry. "The patriarch is appointed to be like 
John rhe Forerunner, the friend of rhe Bridegroom, who lays down his life for 
the puriry of rhe bride."36 More particularly they called on Aleksii to summon 
a widely representative national council of the Russian Orthodox Church 
which would meer to restore the canonical norms of church life. 
Patriarch Aleksii I did not rake up rhe challenge addressed to him by the 
dissident priests. The next narional council took place after his death, in 1971, 
and met for the purpose of electing his successor. It did not undo the arrange­
menrs of 1961. The new patriarch, Pimen, soon faced a similar challenge, 
however. In his "Lenten Lener" of 1972, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn cited the 
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examples ofYakunin and Eshliman seven years earlier and implored Pimen to 
rake rhe iniriarive in rhe suuggle ro free rhe church from bondage even ar the 
price of personal martyrdom. "Do nor ler us suppose, do nor make us rhink 
that for the archpasrors of the Russian Church earthly power is higher rhan 
heavenly power, earthly responsibility more fearsome than responsibility 
before God."37 
Nor all Orrhodox rights activists approved of rhe cacric of challenging rhe 
patriarch and bishops ro confront the srare aurhorities ar any price. One of the 
responses elicired by Solzhenitsyn's "Lenten Letter" provided evidence of 
divided opinion. Ir came from the pen of Father Sergei Zheludkov, a priest in 
rhe ciry of Pskov with a long record of involvement in rhe struggle for 
Orthodox rights and close ries ro the dissidem intelligentsia. He rook excep­
tion ro Solzhenirsyn's all-or-nothing approach, arguing rhar it would lead ro 
martyrdom and an underground church. He held that the legal church "can­
nor be an island of freedom in our strictly and homogeneousLy organized soci­
ety run from a single Center." He approved of rhe hierarchy's policy "some­
how [0 sign intO the system and for the time being [0 make use of the oppor­
tunities permined by ir. "38 Bur in spite of disagreements over rhe hierarchy's 
aCtual or porential role in the srruggle for righrs, mosr Orthodox dissidents 
agre,ed rhat the patriarchal church was rhe Russian Orthodox Church on 
whose behalf rhey were fighring. This consensus in itself resrified ro a consid­
erable degree ofgood will [Oward the church on rhe parr of the acrivisrs. Their 
rolerance demonstrared Christian parience and love. It also refleCted a recog­
nition that rhe real anragonisr of the human rights movement was not the 
Orthodox Church bur the Soviet stare. 
1980-1988: THE MILLENNIUM ARRIVES 
In many ways rhe outlook for human rights in the Sovier Union seemed 
bleaker in 1980 rhan it did in 1965. The repressions of the late 1970S closed 
down the Soviet human rights movemem and confirmed the doubrs ofmany 
concerning rhe prospecrs for changing rhe Sovier sysrem by legal means. 
Orthodox activists experienced these doubrs as acutely as rheir secular col­
leagues. Legalism seemed to have led ro a dead end. The way was open for 
reconceiving rhe struggle for Orthodox righrs along mote radical lines, such 
as an underground ch urch or an alliance wirh righr-wing Russian narionalism. 
Yakunin, as ever rhe leading Otthodox dissident, announced his break with 
the legalisr approach in a report on "The Present Siruarion of rhe Russian 
Orthodox Church and the Prospecrs of a Religious Renewal in Russia," dared 
Augusr 15. 1979.39 In ir he advocared the crearion of a "caracomb church" 
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through secret (though canonical) ordinations of bishops and priests. The 
underground clergy would minister (0 the far-flung masses of Russian 
Onhodox Christians whose needs were nor being met by the severely 
resrricred Moscow Parriarchate. If the Patriarchate refused to collaborate in 
setting up such a nelWork, as it almost surely would, Yakunin advocated cum­
ing to a sister Orthodox church, such as me Orthodox Church in Ametica, 
fOt assistance.40 The practicality of such an approach was debarable. In the 
context of me human rights struggle, however, me impOrtant poim was that 
Yakunin had lOSt confidence in his own movement. 
Yakunin's pessimism roward the Moscow Patriarchare was unrelieved. He 
wenr so far as to assert mat "if the freedom to conduct religious propaganda 
were suddenly granted in our counrry, the members of the Moscow 
Patriarchate would be incapable of profiting from this opportunity.,,41 
Ironically, rhe one servant of the patriarchal church on whom Yakunin passed 
favorable judgment, Famer Dmitry Dudko, scandalized the dissident com­
munity a few monms later with a nationally tdevised recantation of his role 
in the human rights struggle of rhe 1970s.42 It seemed as if history were play­
ing tricks on Yakunin. 
And so it was, though more benignly than he or his colleagues could have 
imagined in the dark days of 1979-80. For even as me dissidents walked me 
via dolorosa of prison, exile, or capitulation, changes were in the making in 
church-state relations and in the Soviet state itself which by the mid-1980s 
produced a more favorable environment for human rights in the Soviet lands 
rhan at any time since the Bolshevik revolution. On the one hand, an accel­
eration of the Orthodox Church's vindication of its historic rights in the 
Russian land enhanced the visibility of the church in Soviet society. Second, 
the accession to power of a group of reform Communists led by Mikhail 
Gorbachev in 1985 opened me way to a rapid advancemem of human rights 
in all spheres of Sovier life. 
The improvemem of me church's historic rights began before Gorbachev's 
accession to power. In the late 1970S and early 1980s the Parriarchate's long­
term srrategy of loyalty to the state began to payoff more palpably than 
before, at least for the cenrral church institutions. The number of theological 
srudents doubled between 1971 and 1981.43 The Publishing Department of me 
Parriarchate increased its Staffand managed ro get a new building consrructed 
in central Moscow ro accommodate work on an expanded range of projects.44 
A large construction project was authorized in 1983 with rhe return of the 
buildings and grounds of the Danilov Monastety to the church. The Danilov, 
named for St. Daniil, a medieval grand prince of Moscow, was rhe city's old­
est monastery. The reStoration of the facility broughr an Orthodox monastic 
ptesence to the capital for the first time in decades as well as providing a highly 
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visible residence for the pauiarch and a sear for the Holy Synod and some 
other units of the Patriarchare. 
The church in the provinces did nm benefIt to the same extent as the cen­
tral institUtions, ahhough there were some improvemenrs. There was a mod­
est increase in the building and reopening of churches in some pans of the 
counrry starting in the late 1970s.45 At about the same time deanery and 
diocesan conventions of clergy, indispensable to the rebuilding of the 
Orthodox Church on the provincial level, began to be held again after a lapse 
of almost three decades.46 
The gains fOt the Orthodox Church in me early 1980s, while small com­
pared w the expansion at the end of the decade, were exceptional in [WO 
respects. First, they exceeded earlier gains by an appreciable margin. Second, 
they occurred during a time of unprecedented lassitude and decline in the 
Soviet Union as whole. Indeed, the Orthodox Church was about the only 
instirution in the counrry w show any vigor in the late 1970S and early 1980s. 
To explain this phenomenon one should probably reckon with a number of 
facwrs ranging from the hand of Providence ro the machinations of atheist 
bureaucrats. The timing of the concessions to the church, for example, makes 
it tempting to suspect that they were inrended as a reward ro plianr hieratchs 
at a time when harsh punishment was being meted Out to Orrhodox rights 
activists. But the gwwth in the church's strength could also be seen as an 
example of the countercyclical capaciry of religion to show vitality when sec­
ular power structutes fall inro decline. 
In any case, the Orthodox hierarchy won real gains, not just cosmetic 
improvemenrs, during the petiod. The bishops showed particular skill in their 
manipulation of a date ofgreat symbolic importance in Russian history: 1988, 
the miJ lennial anniversary of the baptism of the people of Kiev under Prince 
Vladimir in 988. In the struggle for historic rights, historic occasions playa 
key role. By declaring their inrenrion to celebrate the millennium in a gtand 
way the Orthodox hierarchy was able to wage a more or less open campaign 
to enhance the visibility of the church in Soviet sociery. In this effort the 
church probably benefIted not a little from the suPPOrt it enjoyed among 
some of the more nationalistic members of the Soviet establishmenr. 
Bll[ the decisive change that allowed the Moscow Spring of 1988 to happen 
occurred nm in the church but in the ruling elite of the Soviet state. Coming 
to power in 1985, MikhaiJ Gorbachev and his associates promptly set about 
implementing an ambitious reform agenda: first gLasnost', Ot freedom of 
expression; then perestroika, or the restructuring of social, politicaJ, and eco­
nomic institutions. In terms of rights issues the most promising aspeCt of the 
reform effort was the idea of "a state based on law" (pravovoe gOJll.darstvo) and 
the caHs for upgrading the legal profession, making legal services more avail-
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able to ordinary citizens, and establishing the independence oflegal counsel.47 
That the immediate source of these ideas was the "legalist" thinking of the 
Soviet human righrs movemem was toO plain to be missed. The movemem 
had won its case, albeit posthumously. 
In the spring of 1988, virtually on the eve of the church millennium, the 
reform process took a great leap forward when Gorbachev's government 
declared itS intention to create a new national parliament, the Congress of 
People's Deputies. Elections to this body were held in March 1989; it met for 
the first time in June. Similar parliamems were later created on the republican 
level. A substantial body of human rights legislation, including the 1990 laws 
on freedom of religion mentioned above, was one of the most notable accom­
plishments of the new parliamemary insritutions. 
Before 1988 the Communist reformers made no public sratements on reli­
gion. Their silence lefr the teligiously otiemed public in a state of uncertainty 
about the reform process. In May 1987 a group of nine prominent Orthodox 
clergy and laymen ried to the Orthodox righrs movement tried to bring the 
mattet to a head in open letters to Chairman Gorbachev and Patriarch 
Pimen.48 They called on Gorbachev to exrend glasnost and perestroika ro the 
religious sphere by granting believers the right to publish scriptures and reli­
gious literatute, to be heard in the mass media, to participate in rhe prepara­
tion oflegislation affecting religious life, to engage in philanthropy and social 
service-in short, to participate openly and equally in Soviet society. In effect 
the nine called for a consistem policy: "We wish to believe in the reality of the 
restructuring that lies ahead. But the process of democratization going on in 
our country is essemially indivisible. The Russian Orthodox Church cannot 
be left out of it." 
To the patriarch the nine declared that they did not expect the tenewal of 
freedom to be any easier to achieve in the church than in Soviet society at 
large: "Immobilized, mme and timid for so many years, [rhe church] has to 
learn allover again how to walk and talk." The group imploted rhe patriarch 
"nor to let slip the unique histOrical opportunity which the Lord is sending 
our Homeland and our MOther Church." 
Despite the lack ofofficial sratements, however, a gteat libetalization of the 
conditions of religious life was already underway by mid-I987. Religious dis­
sidents, including Father Yakunin, were released from exile or deten rion. 
Yakunin's sacerdOtal functions were restored by the Patriarchate, and he was 
assigned to a parish in the Moscow area. 49 A program to upgrade Jewish insti­
tutions was openly discussed by official spokesmen. 5o Adult baptisands and 
parems preseming children for baptism, ar least in Moscow, were no longer 
asked to show their domesric passpOrt before receiving the sacramem, i.e., the 
rite was no longer subjecr to civil registrarion. 51 As we have noted, this prac­
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tice was long singled Out by critics as an affront to religious conscience and a 
flagrant violation ofSoviet law. Another sign of improvement was the series of 
three international scholatly conferences on Russian Orthodox history and 
tradition commemorating the millennium of the baptism of Russia. 52 The 
conferences marked the first time that the ch urch was allowed to sponsor 
international meetings on a subject other than ecumenism or world peace. 
The second and third conferences in the series featured participation by dis­
tinguished Soviet scholars from secular institutions as well as clergy and the­
ologians. The open collaboration between secular and ecclesiastical scholars 
was another "first" for the postwar period. 
As for rhe legal statUs of religion, there was evidence that new legislation 
was being prepared at the highest levels. In the January 1986 issue of the 
JournaL a/the Moscow Patriarchate thete appeared a mysterious last page enti· 
cled "Our Legal Advice: The RightS and Obligations of Religious Societies."53 
In actualiry the page did not relay "advice" from any ecclesiastical source but 
ptesented eight dtaft paragraphs of a secular law code employing the termi­
nology, but departing from the substance, of the Law on Religious Associa­
tions of 1929. The draft explicitly recognized religious associations as legal 
entities with the right to make COntractS and act as plaintiff or defendant in a 
court of law. It granted religious associations the right to purchase (nor merely 
take on loan) and hold tirle to various kinds of property including titual 
objects, means of transport. and buildings. The right of religious organiza­
tions to employ temporary or permanent staff on cOntract was also recog­
nized. In short, the "Advice" subverted the entire tradition of Soviet legisla­
tion on religion. Since such a publication could not have appeared at the time 
withour official approval, it encouraged hopes for a breakthrough to religious 
liberry in the USSR. The unanswered question was whether the principles of 
"Our Legal Advice" would be written into state law; and if so, when? 
The intentions of the Communist reformers with respect to religion were 
publicly clarified in April 1988 when Chairman Gorbachev held an unptece­
dented and highly publicized roundtable meeting with the senior hierarchs of 
the Russian Onhodox Church. 54 The rone and substance of his remarks were 
conciliatOry even though he felt obliged to declare that Lenin's 1918 Dectee on 
the Separation of the Chutch from the State and the School from the Church 
was a measure that "opened the way for the church to pursue its activities 
without any son of outside intetference." He conceded that "mistakes" were 
made with respect to the church and religious believers in the t930S and there­
after, observed that the errors were being corrected, wished the church well 
on the eve of its millennium and invited the Orthodox communiry to col­
laborate in the wotk of perestroika on the grounds that "we have a common 
history, one Fatherl and and one future." The laSt point was especially 
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poignant in that it was a major ideological retreat for a Communist leader to 
envision religion as having any SOrt of future, never mind the same as his own. 
Most imponandy, GOtbachev announced that "at the present time a new law 
on fteedom of conscience is being devised in which the interests of teligious 
organizations as well as othets will be reflected." The long-rumoted prospect 
was now official. 
When the church observed its millennium in June 1988, then, it did so in 
a spirit of confidence and independence. The main event was a national 
church council composed of the hierarchy and elected clerical and lay repte­
sentatives, The gathering was only the third national council of the Russian 
Orthodox Church in the Soviet period (the others were in 1945 and 1971). It 
was the firSt to be held for a putpose other than electing a successor to a 
deceased patriarch. 
In the area of rights the most important action of the council was the adop­
tion of a fundamental statute for the Russian Orthodox Church. 55 Based 
firmly on Orthodox canon law and the abrogated precedent of 1945, the new 
statute formally ended the bondage of the church to the pattern dictated by 
the Law on Religious Associations of 1929 and the humiliating pseudo-coun­
cil of 1961. It went much further than the statute of 1945 in spelling out struc­
tures of authority and decision-making in the church. A tiered set of institu­
tions at the diocesan, episcopal, and national level was set up to exetcise the 
church's newly won sovereignty over its affairs. At the time of its adoption, of 
course, the statute contradicted existing Soviet laws on religion despite a nOte 
W the contrary placed at the head of the document. The discrepancy may 
explain why the church delayed formal publication of the statute. 56 
Nevertheless, the text circulated freely and its provisions began w be imple­
mented immediately following the council. 
Thus the millennium passed amidSt a great liberation. Seventy years after 
the Bolshevik revolution, the Russian Orthodox Church emerged from its 
Babylonian exile ro claim "a future and a hope" Oeremiah 29:10). 
RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY AND HUMAN RIGHTS SINCE 1988 
The anrlUs mirabilis of 1988 marked the end of the long struggle for civil rights 
and the beginning of a new period in the history of the Russian Orthodox 
Church. The new era is without precedent. Never before, not even in pros­
perous periods of its life under the tsars, did the Russian Church enjoy the 
freedom of action that it possesses today. What the church will do with its 
freedom-how it will respond to the challenges of a complex modern civi­
lization, how it will deal with the religious pluralism of POst-soviet society, 
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what positions it will take with tegard ro the state, rhe schools, ptivate prop­
erry, and the whole tange of modern rights issues-all of these are open ques­
tions. The answers will come, some soon, Others more slowly, as the Russian 
Orrhodox communiry brings its rich tradition of piery and rheology to bear 
on them. One safe prediction is that rhe new situation will Stimulate a gteat 
deal of fresh theological reflection. 
In terms of Russian Orthodoxy and human rights the period since 1988 has 
been shaped by thtee developments: rhe rebuilding of church institutions, rhe 
codification of legal tights, and the emetgence of rights issues quite different 
from those which occupied the church in rhe Soviet period. 
The rebuilding of the Russian Orthodox Chutch has proceeded with 
remarkable rapidiry and on a larger scale than even the friends of the church 
expected. In rhe period 1985-1987 the church opened or reopened a tmal of 29 
parishes, a tespectable numbet by prereform srandards. In 1988, however, 809 
new parishes were registered; in the first nine months of the following year, 
2,185. In roughly the same period a half dozen new theological schools and a 
dozen new monasteries wete opened.57 The repossession of historic monu­
ments large and small-from the Kiev Caves Monastery to street corner 
chapels and rural pilgrimage sites-also proceeded rapidly in all areas of 
Orthodox settlement. The boom continued in the 1990S. By late 1993 the 
number of new and reopened parishes in the Moscow Patriarchate surpassed 
7,000, bringing the total number of patriarchal parishes w more than 14,000. 
In other words, the Patriarchate doubled in size in a five-year period. In the 
same period the number of monasteries rose from about 20 to more rhan 200; 
the number of theological schools, from four to 38.58 The numbet of historic 
Orthodox monumenrs rescored during the period is incalculable. 
The scale of the Orthodox renewal in Russia and the othet countries of rhe 
Moscow Paniarchate would appear w make it the largest revival of hiswric 
Ch tistianity in the twentieth centuty. At the very leaSt the rebuilding of 
Orthodoxy has dramatically alteted the Russian landscape. Russia is begin­
ning ro look like an Otthodox counrey again. 
To be sure, one would have to examine the spititual dimensions of the 
Orthodox revival in ordet co evaluate it ade qua rely. But rhe material facts 
alone prove at leaSt a couple of things. They prove that rhe Orthodox Church's 
claim to possess historic rights in the Russian land enjoys a good measure of 
popular support. Second, they show rhat the Moscow Patriarchate, whatever 
its failings, possesses greater reserves of energy and imagination than its 
Soviet-era detracwrs allowed. When Father Yakunin wrote in 1979 that "if rhe 
freedom to conduct teligious propaganda were suddenly granted in out coun­
try, the members of the Moscow Patriatchate would be incapable of profiting 
from this opportuniry,"59 he scatcely imagined rhat the hout would come 
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when his proposition could be verified. Bur the hour came, and the proposi­
tion turned oUt ro be wrong. 
The codification of the civil rights of the Russian Orthodox Church and 
othet teligious associations in the Soviet lands was achieved with the adoption 
of laws on religious freedom by the legislatures of the USSR and the RSFSR 
in October 1990.60 The All-Union law ceased to apply after the dissolution of 
the USSR at the end of 1991. The 1990 RSFSR law remains in effect in the 
post-soviet Russian Federation. 
The All-Union (USSR) law cattied the principles of "Our Legal Advice" 
(1986) to their logical conclusion. It recognized religious otganizations as legal 
entities (Article 13) and their tight ro acquire and hold various kinds of prop­
erty (Articles 17-20). Ir recognized as "religious organizations" not JUSt local 
congregations bUt "directorates and central institutions, monasteries, religious 
brotherhoods, missionary societies (missions), religious schools and also asso­
ciations of religious organizations" (Article 7). Ir confirmed the right of reli­
gious organizations ro eStablish ties with groups outside the territory of the 
USSR, the right of believers to leave the country for pilgrimages and other 
religious purposes (Articles 9, 22, 24), the right of parents and guardians to 
taise children in a religion (Article 3), and the right of all Soviet citizens to PUt­
sue religious education "in the language of their choice, individually or 
together with others" (Article 6). Ir recognized the right of religious organiza­
tions to conduct religious services and other ritUals in houses ofworship, reli­
gious centers, private homes, cemeteries and crematoria without conditions. 
Services in hospitals, prisons, and homes for the elderly and invalids were 
admitted "at the request of citizens" inhabiting the inStitUtions, with religious 
otganizations having the right to solicit such requests (Article 21). 
The law granted religious organizations the right to solicit voluntary con­
ttibUtions of money and other property, exempting such contributions from 
taxation (Article 18). The right of religious organizations to fOtm business 
enterprises (e.g., publishing, testoration, agricultural concerns) and social ser­
vice institutions such as hospitals and shelters was also recognized. Profits 
ftom such enterprises wete declated taxable (Article 19) unless applied ro chat­
itable or educational ends (Anicle 23). Discriminatoty tax rates on clerical 
income were eliminated (Article 26). 
The RSFSR law recognized all the aforementioned tights and rhen some, 
allowing considerably wider latitude ro religious expression than the A11­
Union law. The law explicicly recognized the religious libetty of foreign citi­
zens on Russian soil (Article 4). It authorized the Russian government "upon 
the requesr of mass religious organizations ... to make decisions regarding the 
declaration of great religious holidays as additional nonworking holidays" 
(Article 14). Ir recognized the right of registered religious organizations ro 
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offer instruction in schools and O[her educational instirurions "on an optional 
basis." & for the milirary, the All-Union law provided only rhar "the com­
mand of military units will nO[ prevem military personnel from taking part in 
religious services or performing religious rituals during their free time" 
(Article 21). The RSFSR law pur the maner in more posirive terms, speaking 
of ''rhe right to conducr and participate in religious rites in military units of 
all branches of service" and charging militaty administrations actively to assist 
citizens with arrangements for religious observance (Article 22). The RSFSR 
law also provided for conscientious objection to the bearing of arms by means 
of an alternative service option (Article 7). 
Another area in which rhe All-Union and RSFSR laws differed was that 
concerning the moniroring of religious organizations. Under the All-Union 
law, registration with the stare authoriries was required of all religious organi­
zarions seeking recognition as legal enrities. 10 supervise the process the law 
provided for "a state organ on religious affairs" to be formed by rhe Council 
of Minisrers of the USSR (Article 29), i.e., a body much like the Soviet-era 
Council for Religious Affairs. The responsibilities of the "organ" included liai­
son with analogous bodies on rhe republican level, information gathering on 
religious activities and on implementarion of rhe laws on religion, offering 
expert advice ro organs of administration and rhe courrs, assisting religious 
organizations in negotiations with state aurhorities and promOting under­
standing and toletance between religious confessions in the coumry and 
abroad. Such a broad mandate clearly envisioned the conrinuation of an 
active, even interventionisr, role for rhe state in religious affairs. 
The RSFSR law broke with the Sovier tradition of monitoring religion 
when ir declared that "executive or administrative organs of srate authority 
and state job posirions specially intended to resolve issues telated ro the 
exercise of citizens' rightS to freedom of religion may not be instirured on 
the rerritory of the RSFSR" (Article 8). Implementation of the law on reli­
gion was assigned to the Ministry ofJustice and local law enforcement agen­
cies. The Council for Religious Affairs was duly abolished in the RSFSR on 
January 1,1991. On the other hand, the RSFSR law preserved the same reg­
istration requirement as rhe All-Union law. It also followed the All-Union 
law in providing for an "expert" council of"represematives of religious orga­
nizations, social organizations, state organs, religious experts, legal experts, 
and other specialisrs in the sphere of freedom of conscience and religion" to 
conduct research and give advice on issues involving religious organizations 
under the auspices of the Comminee on Freedom ofConscience, Religion, 
Charity, and Philanrhropy of the Russian parliament. While a council of 
experts is a far cry from the Council for Religious Affairs with its plenipo­
tentiaries, the RSFSR law still envisions a degree of collaboration between 
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governmental and teligious authorities which a more precise law might have 
sought to avoid. 
In the past, of course, State intervention in the religious sphere was 
prompted mainly by ideological considerations. The aim was to promote 
atheism and discourage religious belief The new laws placed atheism on an 
equal footing with otber atticudes toward religion. Soviet citizens wete always 
free to confess any religion or none at all, but only atheists enjoyed the right 
to propagate their views. The new laws granted all citizens the right to prop­
agate their views and barred the state from financing either atbeist propaganda 
or religious activities. In terms of the constitutional history of the USSR the 
disestablishment of atheism was perhaps the most significanr achievement of 
the new legislation. A year before its demise the USSR became a secular state. 
With the adoption of the 1990 laws on religion most of the issues which 
exercised the Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet human rights move­
ment during the long years of captiviry passed into history. Implemenration 
of the new rights will take time, and there will be complications along the way. 
But the old issues are unlikely to recum to center stage. New issues are already 
taking their place. 
One of these came into view even before the 1990 laws on religious liberty 
were finalized: the role to be played by the Orthodox Church in the legislative 
process itself. During the Soviet period, of course, there was no role for the 
church w play in the legislative arena. But in a democratic Russia, where the 
legislative process is presumably responsive to civil sociery, the question of the 
church's role, and that of Other teligious forces, naturally arises. 
The Russian Orthodox episcopate was deep~y involved in official discus­
sions of the draft of the All-Union law of1990. The bishops wen t so far as w 
publish critical commenraries on the draft before and aftet its adoption, win­
ning a number of changes to their liking and failing to get their way on oth­
ers.61 For example, they urged deletion of a sentence in the section on separa­
tion of church and state providing that "the activities of state organs, organi­
zations and employees may not be accompanied by divine liturgies, religious 
rituals and ceremonies."62 The provision was in fact deleted, which opened 
the way for blessings, prayers, and othet overtly religious actions to be per­
formed on state occasions. So, for example, when Boris Yeltsin was inaugu­
rated as the firSt democratically elected presidenr of Russia in July 1991, the 
patriarch of Moscow rook part in the ceremony, blessing the new officeholder 
and making a speech exhOrting the presidenr and people of Russia "to take lip 
each other's burdens, and thus ... fulfIll the law of Jesus."63 In the negative 
column, the bishops proposed wording guaranreeing that religious instruc­
tion could be given "in the [public] schools on a voluntary extra-curricular 
basis." Pattiatch Aleksii, a membet of the Soviet parliament at the time, vig­
67 
302 Paul Valliere 
orously supporred rhe amendment; bur ir was rejecred by a vote of303 to 46.64 
The All-Union law did nor explicitly bar religious instruction from the 
schools, however; and, as we have nored, rhe RSFSR law was hospitable to it. 
In fact many Russian schools currently accommodate religious instruction, 
usually conducted by clergy or itineram missionaties. The decision [Q allow or 
disallow rests with local school administrations. 
Another deficiency in the All-Union law from the bishops' poim of view 
was its treatmem of Orthodox parish communities as legal emities distinct 
from the church as a corporare body. As the bishops saw it, the legal entity of 
parishes should derive from that of the church as a whole because "in the 
[Orthodox] Church there cannot be 'religious communities' which ate inde­
pendent from the hierarchical cemer and from each other."65 The practical 
issue was the degree of latitude to be enjoyed by local Orthodox churches in 
relation to the central church administration. The Moscow Patriarchate faced 
vigorous challenges from competing Orthodox jurisdictions in the late 
Gorbachev and early pOst-soviet years and feared secessionist movemems in 
its ranks (with good reason). The bishops wan ted to ensure that any Orthodox 
parish that abandoned the Moscow Patriarchate would lose its property and 
rights of legal entity. 
The theoretical issue was the degree to which the "self-understanding of 
the Church," as the bishops called it, should be taken into account by secular 
lawmakers. Secular law aims to treat all religions equally, bur this is easier said 
than done. A law that tegards local teligious communities as autOnomous 
entities, for example, has a diffetent meaning for chutches with congrega­
tionalist polities (e.g., Baptist chutches) than fot a church with an episcopal­
sacramental polity. 
The prominence of the Orthodox hierarchy in the legislative debates of 
1990 pointed to an even latger issue: the role to be played by the Orthodox 
Church in the POst-soviet Russian state. Religious minotities as well as athe­
ists and secularists worry that the chutch is bent on securing a ptivileged posi­
tion fot itself in the new Russia. The sheer size of the Orthodox Church and 
its thousand-year tradition ofstate establishment are certainly grounds for the 
minotities' fears. So is the display, episodic bur ftequent, of the symbols and 
clerical petsonnel of Orthodoxy on all SOrtS of official occasions. So ate the 
innumetable cases of ditect church-state collaboration, including pooling of 
funds, which can be documented throughour Russia tOday. 
One may cite the reconsftuction of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in 
central Moscow as a case in point. This church, once the largesr in Moscow, 
was built in the nineteenth century ro commemorate Russia's victory over 
Napoleon. In 1931 it was dynamired by the CommuniSt city government. In 
January 1995 the parriarch and the mayor ofMoscow laid the cornerstone of a 
Russi: 
replacement srtucture, which is being b· 
Naturally the finished product will nor 
shrine or Baptist or Adventist prayer he 
Privileged treatment of rhe Orthodo 
of its oflJ.cial regisrration as a legal entil 
The formal act of registration had to be 
II's pilgrimage to the Holy Land al 
Meanwhile, othet religious organizal 
Mormons, Baptists, Seventh-Day Adv 
registered by the republican authoriti 
returned home and went to register I 
received from the hands of the Ministe 
rich in symbolism; the number 1.
In short, the blurring ofdistinctions 
in present-day Russia and will remain! 
Clearer legislation, in turn, depends 
Russian civil society as a whole, inclu, 
words, the issue of church-state relatior 
a long time to come. 
Foreign expertS can playa useful ro 
countries to the attention of Russian 
scholars; but in the end the issues of tel 
setded in a way that makes sense to th, 
dition represents a synthesis of univers 
totical conditions and commirmenl 
American critics ofRussia has been to c 
the particular. Bur in Russia as elsewhe 
In the present case respect fOt the p 
penertation of the modern history of cl 
naire approaches. Because the mentalir 
ored by a long tradition of teligious e: 
religious establishment is viewed wid 
rightS theorists, the application of hum 
Orthodoxy can quickly degenerate iure 
But if the job of thinking about hum, 
change the world but to undetstand ir 
othet Otthodox chutches) is a rich sub 
The study of religious establishmer 
establishment, which is a vastet phen< 
one of the most negleCted subjects in t 
special pathos of the Russian church il 
64 
y bar religious insuuc£ion from rhe 
:I, the RSFSR law was hospirabJe [Q if. 
Y accommodate religious insuuction, 
,missionaries. The decision co allow or 
'trations. 
1 law from the bishops' poine of view 
communities as legal encities distinct 
) me bishops saw it, the legal emicy of 
Ie church as a whole because "in rhe 
:Iigious communiries' which are inde­
nd from each other. "65 The practicall 
ljoyed by local Ormodox churches in 
ation. The Moscow Pauiarchate faced 
Orehodox jurisdictions in rhe late 
wd feared secessionisr movemenes in 
swaneed to ensure rhat any Orehodox 
riarchate would lose irs propercy and 
ir was rejected by a vore of303 co 46.
co which rhe "self-undemanding of 
auld be taken inro accoum by secular 
:eligions equally, bur this is easier said 
igious communiries as auconomous 
leaning for churches with congrega­
than for a church with an episcopal­
ierarchy in rhe legislarive debares of 
e role co be played by the Orthodox 
Religious minoriries as well as athe­
is benr on securing a privileged posi­
:er siz.e of the Orehodox Church and 
ishmenr are certainly grounds for me 
:iic but frequem, of rhe symbols and 
;orrs of official occasions. So are rhe 
. collaborarion, including pooling of 
;hout Russia coday. 
he Cathedral of Christ rhe Savior in 
church, once the largest in Moscow, 
commemorare Russia's viccory over 
:he Communisr cicy governmenr. In 
ofMoscow laid rhe cornersrone of a 
Russian Orthodoxy and Human Rights 303 
replacemene suucture, which is being built wirh heavy reliance on state funds. 
Naturally the finished product will nor be a hiscoricaJ monumenc or milirary 
shrine or Baptisr or Advenrist prayer house, but an Ormodox church.66 
Privileged rreatrnenr of me Orehodox Church was evidene on the occasion 
of irs official regisuation as a legal encicy in the RSFSR in the spring of 1991. 
The formal act of regisrration had ro be postponed because ofPattiarch Aleksii 
II's pilgrimage co the Holy Land and Other scheduling complications. 
Meanwhile, other religious organiz.ations including Jehovah's Witnesses, 
Mormons, Baptisrs, Sevench-Day Advencists, and Buddhists were officially 
registered by the republican authorities. Nevereheless, when the pauiarch 
returned home and wenr co register his church, the official documenr he 
received from rhe hands of me Minister of]ustice bore a regisuation number 
rich in symbolism: the number 1.67 
In shore, rhe blurring of distincrions between church and state is pervasive 
in presenr-day Russia and will remain so uncil clarified by more precise laws. 
Clearer legislation, in turn, depends on rhe clarificarion of attitlldes in 
Russian civil sociecy as a whole, including the Onhodox Church. In orher 
words, me issue of church-state relations will remain a lively one in Russia for 
a long rime co come. 
Foreign expens can playa useful role by bringing rhe experience of orher 
counuies co rhe attencion of Russian legislacors, church leaders and legal 
scholats; but in the end rhe issues of religion and policy facing Russia must be 
serded in a way mar makes sense co rhe Russians memselves. Every legal [fa­
dition represenes a synchesis of universal notions of rights wirh concrete his­
torical conditions and commitmenrs. The tendency of European and 
American criries ofRussia has been co concenrrate on rhe universal and ignore 
rhe particular. But in Russia as elsewhere the parricular demands irs due. 
In rhe presenc case tespecr for me parricular means making a sympathetic 
penetrarion of rhe modern hiscory of rhe Russian church and resisring docui­
naire approaches. Because me memalicy of Russian Orthodoxy is deeply col­
ored by a long tradition of religious esrablishmenc, and because rhe idea of 
religious establishmem is viewed wirh suspicion by mosr modern human 
righrs theorisrs, rhe application ofhuman righrs rheory co me case of Russian 
Orthodoxy can quickly degenerare inco polemies and simplisric dichocomies. 
But if the job of rhinking abour human righrs is in rhe first instance not to 
change the world but to undersrand ir, the case of Russian Orehodoxy (and 
orhet Orehodox churches) is a rich subjecr for the invesrigaco[. 
The study of religious establishmenr-panicularly de facto sociocultural 
esrablishmenr, which is a vasrer phenomenon rhan the juridical variecy-is 
one of rhe mosr neglecred subjecrs in the compararive study of religion. The 
special parhos of the Russian church in the twemierh century is also scanrly 
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appreciated. The Russian Orthodox Church was not disestablished by a 
constitutional process but by a cruel and arbitrary powet determined to 
eradicate the church altogether. Far from living "at ease in Zion," the lead­
ers of the church trod the parh of persecution and martyrdom.68 Thar rhe 
blood of rhe martyrs is the seed of the church is a rruism of church history. 
What is not so widely recognized is that the principle applies JUSt as much 
ro priestly church establishments as ro prophetic minorities. The aura of 
sanctity abour the patriarchal church was enhanced, not diminished, by 
Communist persecution. 
The mentality of establishmenr is not confined to church circles. The 
Russian srate is as inrerested in promoring close church-srate relarions as the 
episcopate, and wirh good reason. Present-day Russia is nor a peaceful, pros­
perous, or productive country. Devasrated by decades of oppression, Russian 
civil society must be rebuilt from the ground up. In these circumstances no 
Russian government, particularly not a democtatic one, can afrord to draw a 
cordon sanitaire betWeen itself and the largest and hest organized institurion of 
Russian civil society.69 
Interreligious, intercommunal, and internarional relations are orher arena..~ 
in which complex rights issues are emerging for Russian Orthodoxy. Mosr of 
the faith communiries of pOst-soviet Eutasia are experiencing genuine reli­
gious liberty for the firsr time, and thete is confusion abour whar ir means. 
There is a real danger that rhe free marker in religion will spawn violent eth­
nic and religious conflicrs. In Ukraine, for example, no fewer rhan three sep­
arate Eastern church jurisdicrions-Ukrainian Orthodox (Moscow Patri­
archare), Ukrainian Autocephalous, and Ukrainian Catholic-vie for a share 
of the rich ecclesiasrical patrimony of rhe region. Compecing Orrhodox juris­
dictions also distutb the peace of the church in rhe Russian Federation. 
The growrh of nontraditional Chrisrian seers and exotic non-Christian or 
pseudo-Christian cults in Russia represents an even more baflling challenge to 
Orthodoxy. The Russian Orthodox community has long been used to dealing 
with Muslim Tarars, Buddhisr Mongols, and orher peoples of the Russian 
Federarion whose religious orientation is a matter of historic rradition. It has 
a harder rime coming to terms wirh Russians who embtace nontradirional 
religious options. Orthodox sensiriviries in this regard have been greatly exac­
erbared by the ridal wave of foreign missionaries that has washed over Russia 
since 1988. The church views most of the newcomers as interlopers whose 
vocation is to rustle rhe Russian people away from its true shephetds. The 
irony is that the foreign missionaries operate under the wartant of the 1990 
law on religious liberty which the Orthodox Church helped set in place. 
Refusal to accept this irony for what it is led the senior hierarchy of rhe 
Russian Orrhodox Church to launch what can be termed its mosr controver-
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sial initiative of the 1990S relative to human rights: agitation to amend the 
1990 legislarion on religion in such a way as to bar or otherwise limir the reli­
gious aCtivities of foreigners on the territory of the Russian Federarion. An 
amended Jaw was in faCt adopted by the Russian parliamem in rhe summer of 
1993, only ro be veroed by President Yelrsin. A revised version of the amend­
mem also turned our to be a dead lener following Yelrsin's forcible dispersal of 
the parliament in the birrer conflicr of September-Ocrober 1993. Still. rhe 
issue has not been laid to resc Another revision of the 1990 law has been under 
discussion in the Duma since 1994. Ar hearings on the mattet in early 1995 the 
Patriarchate let it be known that it still favors limitations on the religious 
activities of foteigners in Russia.7° 
The Patriarchare's campaign drew a good deal of international anention 
and prompted the intervention of Western-based human rights activists. 
International conferences on the issue were held in 1994 and 1995 at which the 
proposed limitations on religious acriviry in Russia were roundly criticized as 
violating the international human rights norms stated in the Universal 
Declaration. the Helsinki Final Act, rhe Vienna Concluding Document 
(1989), and other instruments ro which Russia is a parry.7 t There is no reason 
ro suppose that the monitoring of religious conditions in Russia and other 
post-Communist stares will cease any rime soon. Western missionary and 
human rights groups are well otganized, well financed, and well connected 
polirically. Russian church leaders will not be able [0 ignote them. Even less 
will a democratically oriented Russian government find it easy to counte­
nance violations of rreaties to which it is a signarory. In effect, the environ­
menr in which the Russian Orrhodox Church carries out its ministry has 
been imernationalized. 
The outlook for relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and 
Wesrern religious and rights organizations should not be painted [00 darkly. 
Strong internationalisr currems have long existed in the chutch. especially 
among rhe hierarchy. An interesting featute of the Russian bishops' commen­
tary on the All-Union law of 1990, for example. was theit commendation of 
international human rights insrruments. The bishops hailed the AlI-Union 
law as the first piece of Soviet legislation rhat "answers [0 rhe fundamental 
principles of the Universal Declararion of Human Rights, the Final Act of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the other agreements 
reached by participating governmenrs in the course of implementing the 
Helsinki process. "72 
Even more important as a stimulus to inrernarionalism is the composition 
of rhe parriarchal church irself. Always more cosmopoliran than irs repurarion. 
the Moscow Patriarchate became a truly inrernational community of churches 
following the breakup of the USSR in 1991. Preeminent not just in Russia, the 
'I
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patriarchal church is the largest church in Ukraine and Belarus, one of the 
largesr in rhe Baltic countties, and a significam presence on the religious scene 
in all fifteen pOst-soviet states. The church also has close, if no longer juridi­
cal, ties ro a daughter-church in North America, the Onhodox Church in 
America. The leadership of rhe Patriarchate is deeply committed ro holding 
this diverse community of churches rogether ro the extent possible in the face 
of ethnic, political, and ecclesiastical pressures to rhe contrary. Many chutch­
men surely recognize rhar the interests of rhe Pattiarchare and its huge flock 
in rhe Near Abroad and elsewhere will be bener protected in rhe long run 
through reliance on international human rights norms than by religious pro­
tecrionism, ad hoc political pressures, or other artificial arrangements. 
Crirics of me Moscow Patriarchare view irs effortS to preserve irs organiza­
tion in rhe Near Abroad as a dangerous manifestation of neo-sovier "empire~ 
saving. "73 The accusarion should not be dismissed lightly, since rhe alienation 
ofsome twenty-five million Russians from rhe Russian state is certainly a polir­
ical earrhquake rhar will send aftershocks rhrough rhe region for years to come. 
But it is equally important to recognize thar rhere is an ecclesiastical principle 
ar stake in rhe ambitions of rhe Moscow Patriarchate. Sectarianism, splinter­
ing and the proliferarion ofjurisdictions are not rhe final word in church polity 
from an Orthodox point of view. Nor is there any theological reason for the 
church to mirror the polirical divisions of the age. It may be a good thing for 
post-soviet Eurasia ro divide into erhnically based democratic republics. But 
rhe Russian church is nor a republican entity any more rhan ir was a tsarist or 
Sovier enrity. Its citizenship is in heaven. Like the cross of Christ in which ir 
glories, rhe Orrhodox Church srands "rowering o'er the wrecks of time." 
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